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ABSTRACT: This Response briefly considers when false advertising can give
rise to antitrust liability. The biggest difference between tort and antitrust
liability is that the latter requires harm to the market, which is critically
dependent on actual consumer response. As a result, the biggest hurdle a
private plaintiff faces in turning an act of false advertising into an antitrust
offense is proving causation—to what extent can a decline in purchase
volume or other market rejection be attributed specifically to the defendant’s
false claims? This causation requirement dooms the great majority of false
advertising claims attacked as violations of the Sherman Act. One important
exception arises when the false statements are made in an institutional setting
where truthfulness is mandated and reliance is naturally stronger. We point
to the example of product disparagement in the pharmaceutical industry.
Depending on the context, false claims, particularly in a regulatory or
adjudicatory setting, can lead much more reliably to harm.
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INTRODUCTION

In An Antitrust Framework for False Advertising, Michael Carrier and
Rebecca Tushnet propose a rebuttable presumption of antitrust liability
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act for monopolists and would-be
monopolists who engage in false advertising. 1 The presumption, they say, is
necessary because the current judicial threshold “essentially makes it
impossible to bring a successful antitrust case based on false advertising” and
“[a]ntitrust law has been kneecapped by the courts and thus is powerless to
act.” 2
First, it is not clear that the courts are in fact “kneecapped,” are hostile
to false advertising-based antitrust claims, or lack judicial tools capable of
addressing anticompetitive false advertising. Second, the presumption
effectively removes the requirement for a plaintiff to show that the false
advertising constitutes exclusionary conduct within reach of the antitrust laws,
which raises serious causation concerns. There is also the difficulty of tasking
courts with distinguishing between false statements that are “puffery” and
those that are capable of harming not just a particular rival but also
competition itself. Limiting the presumption to monopolists and
incorporating the elements of Lanham Act false advertising do not fully
resolve these problems. The authors’ framework carries less risk if applied to
false statements in certain contexts, e.g., product disparagement of FDAapproved biosimilar and generic drugs in the pharmaceutical industry. Here,
the interplay of regulatory and patent law and the characteristics of the
healthcare system make false statements more likely to harm new entrants,
restrict output, and raise prices relative to false advertising in other markets.
Further, the regulatory process may impose expectations of truthful
statements that the ordinary give-and-take of advertising lacks.
II. ANTITRUST & FALSE ADVERTISING LAWS HAVE DISPARATE BUT
OVERLAPPING AIMS
Carrier and Tushnet suggest a framework in which false advertising
presumptively constitutes exclusionary conduct under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, and triggers liability when the defendant is a monopolist (or
attempted monopolist). 3 The authors base their proposal on the aligned

1. Michael A. Carrier & Rebecca Tushnet, An Antitrust Framework for False Advertising, 106
IOWA L. REV. 1841, 1844 (2021).
2. Id. at 1843–44.
3. See id. at 1876. Without the authors’ presumption, a plaintiff bringing a claim under
Section 2 ordinarily must show: “(1) the [defendant’s] possession of monopoly power in the
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policies of antitrust and false advertising laws, the inadequacy of false
advertising remedies, and the gravity of potential harm to consumers and
markets that can result from consumer deception. They analogize the
proposed presumption with the “quick look” approach to certain Section 1
antitrust cases, and they draw on the Supreme Court’s discussion of false or
misleading advertising in California Dental Ass’n v. FTC for further support. 4
But, as we will outline in this Part, each of these factors highlights the danger
of applying a presumptive framework to business torts like false advertising
and counsels a more cautious approach.
A. DIVERGENT GOALS OF ANTITRUST & FALSE ADVERTISING LAWS
The judicial decisions that Carrier and Tushnet reference do not really
show a refusal to recognize the harms of false advertising by any laws, but
rather that many instances of false advertising are not cognizable specifically
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which has a different purpose than
consumer protection and unfair competition laws. 5 The authors believe that
both antitrust and false advertising laws ultimately are concerned with
consumer welfare and argue that courts should be less hesitant to find
antitrust violations since false advertising can harm consumers, “can entrench
powerful positions that harm consumers and the market as a whole[,]” and
can erode truth in the market, creating a “market for lemons.” 6 In discussing

relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished
from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or
historical accident.” United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966); see also Am.
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946) (describing monopoly power as the
ability “to exclude actual or potential competition from the field”). The second element requires
a showing of anticompetitive activity, i.e., conduct that causes unjustified and substantial harm to
competition within a relevant market, potentially by raising rivals’ costs or foreclosing
competitors.
4. Carrier & Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1874; Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771–
74 (1999).
5. The authors rely on Retractable Technologies, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., where the court
“stated that absent a demonstration that a competitor’s false advertisements had the potential to
eliminate, or did in fact eliminate, competition, an antitrust lawsuit will not lie.” Carrier &
Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1850–51 (citing Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 842
F.3d 883, 895 (5th Cir. 2016)). The court also distinguishes one of its earlier cases finding
antitrust liability for false statements, since those statements concerned plaintiff firm’s solvency
and product quality and threatened to cut off access to distribution channels. Retractable Techs,
842 F.3d at 895 n.3 (citing Multiflex, Inc. v. Samuel Moore & Co., 709 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1983)).
This is an extremely high threshold but not “an abandonment of antitrust analysis” that
“completely absolves false advertisers of antitrust liability.” Carrier & Tushnet, supra note 1, at
1850.
6. Carrier & Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1843, 1849. The authors describe the facts in FTC
v. AT&T Mobility LLC as an example of how false advertising can “harm consumers and the
market [overall].” Id. at 1843 (citing FTC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1087 (N.D. Cal.
2015), rev’d and remanded, 835 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 864 F.3d 995 (9th
Cir. 2017)). But in this case, the court engaged in statutory interpretation of Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2018), and the common carrier
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the importance of truthful advertising in ensuring a competitive market,
Carrier and Tushnet assert that “[c]onsumers expecting false advertising are
likely to distrust even truthful claims” and outline the harms—economic,
physical, and moral—that can result from deception. 7
While consumer welfare is a common concern for both antitrust and false
advertising law, antitrust is focused on promoting competition, not policing
unfair conduct. A firm may engage in anticompetitive or unfair activities, but
that conduct will not come within range of the antitrust laws unless there is a
broader effect on competition as a whole. 8 The antitrust “laws do not create a
federal law of unfair competition or ‘purport to afford remedies for all torts
committed by or against persons engaged in interstate commerce.’” 9 This
rationale informs the requirement, under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, that
a plaintiff show both power and exclusionary conduct to make a prima facie
case of monopolization. 10 With these goals in mind, a presumption of
antitrust liability for monopolists and would-be monopolists is unsuitable for
false advertising claims, where the false advertising is unlikely to harm
competition.
B. ANTITRUST LIABILITY IS NOT THE PROPER CURE FOR INADEQUATE FALSE
ADVERTISING REMEDIES
Carrier and Tushnet argue that antitrust remedies are appropriate
because false advertising laws do not fully address the harms that result from
deception. 11 But this is irrelevant unless harm to competition can be shown, and
the proposed anti-competitive presumption, focusing on monopolists or
attempted monopolists, is no substitute. 12 As several courts have observed,
exception, and did not address market-wide anticompetitive effects. See AT&T Mobility, 87 F.
Supp. 3d at 1090–91, 1100–01.
7. Carrier & Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1849.
8. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993) (The Sherman Act
“directs itself not against conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but against conduct
which unfairly tends to destroy competition itself.”); see also Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225 (1993) (“Even an act of pure malice by one
business competitor against another does not, without more, state a claim under the federal
antitrust laws . . . .”).
9. Brooke Grp. Ltd., 509 U.S. at 225 (quoting Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821, 826
(1945)).
10. See 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION (5th ed. 2022) (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript
at ¶ 651d) (“‘[E]xclusionary’ comprehends at the most behavior that not only (1) tends to impair
the opportunities of rivals, but also (2) either does not further competition on the merits or does
so in an unnecessarily restrictive way.”); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472
U.S. 585, 605 n.32 (1985). Private plaintiffs also must show causation and harm, where the type
of showing depends on whether the complaint requests injunctive relief or damages for past
anticompetitive conduct. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 16 (2018).
11. Carrier & Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1844.
12. Antitrust liability cannot be premised on the inadequacy of false advertising remedies
in addressing the injuries of misled or deceived consumers but must be grounded in competitive
harm. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) (“Plaintiffs must
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false advertising generally does not threaten competition. 13 Though the
authors are skeptical that false advertising could ever be pro-competitive,
recent economics research suggests that even that skeptical position has its
limitations. In particular, unreasonably harsh penalties could decrease
consumer welfare. 14 While the potential development of a “market for
lemons” is a concern, the economics and case law do not provide a
justification for using Section 2 of the Sherman Act as a prophylactic for the
generalized harms that may result from false advertising. 15
Finally, the determination of false advertising’s exclusionary power
depends critically on whether it has a significant long-run component or is
purely a variable cost. If the value of advertising lasts only so long as it is
ongoing and dissipates after it stops, then it very likely would not be able to
prove antitrust injury . . . of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows
from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful. The injury should reflect the anticompetitive
effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation.” (emphasis
added)); see also Phillip Areeda, Antitrust Violations Without Damage Recoveries, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1127, 1127 (1976) (“[T]he desire to encourage private enforcement and to penalize antitrust
violations is no excuse for awarding damages that are non-existent, inconsistent with antitrust
policy, or unconnected with the true rationale for imposing antitrust liability.”).
13. The court, in Retractable Technologies noted that “[r]ecord evidence even indicates that
some customers . . . increased their purchases . . . after being shown [the defendant’s] erroneous
‘waste space’ comparisons,” which were literally false. Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton Dickinson
& Co., 842 F.3d 883, 896–97 (5th Cir. 2016). “Indeed, competition within the overall safety
syringe market—particularly between BD, Covidien, and Smiths—has remained robust.” Id. at
896.
14. While “deception [may] lower[] credibility and reduce[] buyers’ purchase intentions,”
in certain cases “false advertising counteracts monopoly power by lowering buyers’ quality
expectations and prompting lower prices.” Andrew Rhodes & Chris M. Wilson, False Advertising,
49 RAND J. ECON. 348, 349 (2018); see also Salvatore Piccolo, Piero Tedeschi & Giovanni Ursino,
How Limiting Deceptive Practices Harms Consumers, 46 RAND J. ECON. 611, 611 (2015) (“We show
that greater protection against deceptive practices does not necessarily improve the buyer
welfare.”); Kenneth S. Corts, Finite Optimal Penalties for False Advertising, 62 J. INDUS. ECON. 661,
663 (2014) (“[E]xtremely high expected penalties for false claims might induce a firm to
undertake costly learning, even when it is not socially optimal to do so . . . .”). For a discussion of
the potentially harmful market effects of disparate restrictions on false advertising in the context
of the FTCA, see Roger E. Schechter, Letting the Right Hand Know What the Left Hand’s Doing: The
Clash of the FTC’s False Advertising and Antitrust Policies, 64 B.U. L. REV. 265, 266 (1984) (“Antitrust
concerns arise when competing firms have disparate freedom to advertise, because consumers
may erroneously view the products of the most severely constrained competitor as comparatively
unattractive.”).
15. Carrier & Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1865 (explaining that “antitrust offers the more
powerful remedies of treble damages and automatic . . . attorneys’ fees,” and offers injunctive
relief that “could more generally target false advertising and marketwide harm to competition”).
For an analysis of a similar argument in the context of antitrust’s treatment of labor issues, see
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Harm and Causation, 99 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022)
(manuscript at 22), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3771399 [https://p
erma.cc/K2A2-RPUN] (“Like most regulatory goals, they require a degree of legislative or
administrative specificity that the antitrust concern for competitive markets does not capture.
Further, in every one of these areas legislative systems are in place to address the problem. Even
if we agree that these other policies are imperfect, antitrust has neither the mandate nor the
toolbox it would need to rule the entire world of labor policy.”).
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create the durable monopoly power that Section 2 of the Sherman Act
requires. This is particularly likely if rivals are able to counter with their own
offsetting advertising. By contrast, the harm could be much more substantial
if advertising operates as an “investment” that lasts even after expenses for it
have stopped. 16
C. ANALOGY WITH “QUICK LOOK” CASES DOES NOT APPLY TO FALSE ADVERTISING
A presumption of antitrust liability for false advertising conduct is not
justified by the authors’ analogy 17 with the “quick look” approach in Sherman
Act Section 1 cases decided under the rule of reason. The abbreviated “quick
look” analysis is appropriate when “the experience of the market has been so
clear, or necessarily will be, that a confident conclusion about the principal
tendency of a restriction will follow from a quick (or at least quicker) look, in
place of a more sedulous one.” 18 But false advertising is not so wellunderstood, and sufficiently diverse that generalization is impossible. The
economic literature suggests that we cannot rely on our intuitions about how
falsehoods influence consumer decision-making and competition within a
relevant market. 19 False advertising constitutes unilateral conduct
distinguishable from horizontal agreements to fix prices or limit output,
where the courts “require[] some competitive justification even in the
absence of a detailed market analysis.” 20
In California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, the Supreme Court declined to support
an abbreviated quick look analysis. 21 There, the court acknowledged the
potential procompetitive impact of the defendant’s restrictions on advertising
and rejected the Court of Appeal’s quick look approach:
The point is not that the [defendant’s] restrictions necessarily have
the procompetitive effect claimed by the [defendant]; it is possible
that banning quality claims might have no effect at all on
competitiveness if, for example, many dentists made very much the
same sort of claims. And it is also of course possible that the
restrictions might in the final analysis be anticompetitive. The point,
rather, is that the plausibility of competing claims about the effects

16. See generally Kristian S. Palda, The Measurement of Cumulative Advertising Effects, 38 J. BUS.
162 (1965) (finding long term effects); Gene M. Grossman & Carl Shapiro, Informative Advertising
with Differentiated Products, 51 REV. ECON. STUD. 63 (1984) (assuming longer term effects). Cf.
Leonard M. Lodish et al., A Summary of Fifty-Five In-Market Experimental Estimates of the Long-Term
Effect of TV Advertising, 14 MKTG. SCI. G133 (1995) (finding that the effects of much advertising
dissipate soon after the advertising ceases).
17. See Carrier & Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1873–74.
18. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999).
19. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
20. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 110 (1984).
21. Carrier & Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1874 (“[T]he court found that an association’s broad
restrictions on . . . advertising were ‘designed to avoid false or deceptive advertising.’” (quoting
Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 771)).
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of the professional advertising restrictions rules out the indulgently
abbreviated review . . . . 22
The court’s analysis emphasizes the importance of examining the market
effects of the defendant’s conduct rather than presuming competitive harm.
III. COURTS ARE CONCERNED WITH ESTABLISHING CAUSATION, CLASSIFYING
FALSE STATEMENTS, & AVOIDING IMPROPER USE OF ANTITRUST
Carrier and Tushnet believe that the courts are unreasonably reluctant
to find antitrust liability for false advertising and “have worried about applying
antitrust’s robust remedies of treble damages and attorneys’ fees” when “not
every instance of false advertising violates antitrust law.” 23 However, the
courts’ reluctance to impose antitrust liability in these cases is not based only
on overdeterrence concerns, the idea that false statements are not harmful,
or the availability of other remedies (e.g., those available under the Lanham
Act). 24 An alternative explanation is that courts are reluctant to find antitrust
liability when it is unclear whether false statements really are false and have
caused harm to competition in a particular case. 25 In response to these
concerns, the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals have developed three different
approaches to Section 2 monopolization based on false advertising.
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits have stated, as a matter of law, that “[f]alse
statements about a rival’s goods do not curtail output in either the short or
the long run,” “[c]ommercial speech is not actionable under the antitrust
laws,” and while “[s]ome other law may require judicial intervention in order
to increase the portion of truth in advertising[,] the Sherman Act does not.” 26
Carrier and Tushnet term this first approach the “no-liability rule.” 27 In a
second approach, the Second, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits use
the de minimis framework, where false advertising presumptively does not
cause significant harm and does not violate the antitrust laws. 28 A plaintiff can
22. Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 778.
23. Carrier & Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1843; see also id. at 1867 (“We suspect that much of
the courts’ hostility . . . comes from the conviction that antitrust remedies are harsh, and that
false advertising remedies are thus more appropriate . . . .”).
24. Id. at 1843, 1850 (“[A]s a baseline principle, the presence of one set of remedies is not
preclusive of another set when the facts implicate both . . . .”).
25. There is the additional consideration that liability for unilateral false advertising under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act requires market power and monopolists, and attempted
monopolists “are a numerically small percentage of businesses (and of false advertising
defendants) . . . .” Carrier & Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1844.
26. Sanderson v. Culligan Int’l Co., 415 F.3d 620, 623–24 (7th Cir. 2005); see also
Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 842 F.3d 883, 895 (5th Cir. 2016) (“That
false advertising alone hardly ever operates in practice to threaten competition is confirmed not
only by a dearth of Fifth Circuit precedent but by two additional considerations. First, false
advertising simply ‘set[s] the stage for competition in a different venue: the advertising market.’”
(alteration in original) (quoting Sanderson, 415 F.3d at 623)).
27. Carrier & Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1862.
28. See id. at 1854–62 (reviewing cases from Courts of Appeals following the de minimis
approach).
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rebut the de minimis presumption by satisfying a six-factor test: the advertising
must be “(1) clearly false, (2) clearly material, (3) clearly likely to induce
reasonable reliance[,] (4) made to buyers without knowledge of the subject
matter, (5) continued for prolonged periods, and (6) not readily susceptible
of neutralization or other offset by rivals.” 29 The third approach is a case-bycase analysis where courts determine whether, “viewed as a whole,” the
defendant’s statements could have had an anticompetitive effect. 30
One premise of the authors’ proposed framework is that these
approaches are inadequate. 31 But even in the Seventh Circuit, which has
arguably the highest threshold for liability, it is difficult to see how the courts’
antitrust analysis of false advertising conduct is inadequate—the courts have
recognized when false advertising is exclusionary and causes harm to the
market as a whole. 32 Broader application of the antitrust laws via a
presumption of liability is not the optimal or proper solution for false
advertising conduct, even though such conduct can injure rivals and
consumers. It is not the role of antitrust law to police commercial speech that
is competitively “on the merits” 33 unless it can be shown to cause
29. 3B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION (5th ed. 2022) (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript
at ¶ 782b).
30. W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 109–10 (3d Cir. 2010)
(reversing the district court’s dismissal of Sherman Act claims because the totality of the
defendant’s conduct could have deprived the plaintiff-rival of critical inputs, including patient
referrals, employees, and financing at reasonable rates).
31. See Carrier & Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1863 (“The approaches abandoning antitrust
liability and applying a de minimis analysis are not justified: The law and practice of false
advertising is far more consistent with antitrust’s own general vision of the marketplace. And the
case-by-case evaluation could use development.”). The authors do not provide instances of courts
denying false advertising-based Section 2 liability despite likely exclusionary effects. Instead, they
point to (1) Lanham Act cases that did not involve Section 2 claims; (2) Section 2 cases finding
no liability (or no prima facie case) where the facts showed no anticompetitive effects, as in
Retractable Techs., 842 F.3d at 883; and (3) Section 2 cases finding liability even though the facts
showed no anticompetitive effects, as in Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 789–91
(6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1148 (2003). See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Int’l Equip. Trading, Ltd. v. Illumina, Inc., No. 17 C 5010, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 136718, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 2018) (stating that “false statements accompanied with
an ‘enforcement mechanism’ can constitute predative conduct under antitrust law” and denying
a motion to dismiss a Sherman Act Section 2 attempted monopolization claim); see also Mercatus
Grp., LLC v. Lake Forest Hosp., 641 F.3d 834, 851 (7th Cir. 2011) (commercial speech cannot
support an antitrust claim without “some sort of ‘enforcement mechanism’ designed somehow
to coerce or compel that competitor to heed the admonition”).
33. The authors express understandable incredulity that courts could describe false or
misleading statements as “on the merits.” Carrier & Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1853–54.
Determining whether competition is on the merits is a mechanism to detect when causation will
be difficult or impossible to establish. Consumers generally can consider many sources of
information when making decisions. When their choices are unconstrained, it is hard to know
what they relied on, but when there is an enforcement mechanism involved (e.g., a bribe or a
threat), consumer choices are constrained, which simplifies the causal inquiry. Statements that
are on the merits are not necessarily truthful or non-misleading but rather, they are economically
rational and do not limit the consumers decisions based on considerations (e.g., a bribe or a
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anticompetitive harms, such as a price increase flowing from market output
restriction or a restraint on innovation. This is particularly true when the
challenged conduct is an ordinary part of competition.
Many firms engage in forms of exaggeration or “puffery” that are unlikely
to have anticompetitive market effects, even if they harm a particular rival.
There is a danger in extending a presumption of antitrust liability to include
business torts like false advertising, particularly when tort law itself almost
never requires an assessment of market power and the likelihood of
maintaining or creating monopoly. 34 As the Supreme Court stated recently,
in the context of a Section 1 claim:
Recognizing the inherent limits on a court’s ability to master an
entire industry—and aware that there are often hard-to-see
efficiencies attendant to complex business arrangements—we take
special care not to deploy these condemnatory tools until we have
amassed “considerable experience with the type of restraint at issue”
and “can predict with confidence that it would be invalidated in all
or almost all instances.” 35
In many cases, it will be difficult to show that false statements caused
harm to competition. 36 False statements are incapable of excluding rivals or
unlawfully maintaining a monopoly directly 37 as they must first go through
consumers, whose beliefs and decision-making determine whether the false
statement causes harm. When false statements are not “clearly false” but
threat) external to the product or service. See Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d
518, 523 (5th Cir. 1999) (describing “behavior that—examined without reference to its effects
on competitors—is economically irrational” as not “on the merits”); see also Aspen Skiing Co. v.
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610–11 (1985) (noting that the dominant ski
company failed to offer any efficiency justification for its decisions and “was willing to sacrifice
short-run benefits and consumer goodwill in exchange for a perceived long-run impact on its
smaller rival”).
34. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 29 (manuscript at ¶ 782a1).
35. NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2156 (2021) (quoting Leegin Creative Leather Prods.,
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886–87 (2007)); see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 29
(manuscript at ¶ 782a1) (“We must be aware of the inclination to condemn a monopolist on the
basis of antisocial behavior that could not possibly give it an improper advantage in the market.”).
36. For a discussion of these principles and a description of such cases, see AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 29 (manuscript at ¶ 782b); see also Spanish Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Clear
Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 376 F.3d 1065, 1076–77 (11th Cir. 2004) (without evidence of harm
to competition, plaintiff could not state Section 2 claim based on misrepresentations where the
market as a whole and the plaintiff’s own sales were expanding); Reed Constr. Data Inc. v.
McGraw-Hill Cos., 638 F. App’x 43, 46 (2d Cir. 2016) (dismissing a false advertising-based
Section 2 claim where plaintiff could not show that the statements at issue were material to
consumer decision-making); Santana Prods., Inc. v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 401 F.3d
123, 132 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1031 (2005) (“It is undisputed that the defendants
informed potential customers that [the plaintiff’s] product presented safety hazards. [The
plaintiff] has not, however, demonstrated that [the defendant] imposed any restraints on
trade.”).
37. In other words, false statements do not operate as direct restraints on output, price, or
choice of supplier/distributor.
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constitute “puffery,” or ordinary exaggerations in advertising, consumers are
unlikely to believe or rely on them. This also is true of deceptive statements
that are immaterial, that consumers easily can dispel, or that competitors can
counteract through advertisements of their own. And even when false
advertising succeeds in deceiving consumers, there are no guarantees that this
impacts the market. Consumers may have many reasons for selecting one
firm’s services instead of another’s, and those who are “actually upset about
the ultimate prices and services they obtained [can] switch back to another
manufacturer.” 38 The six factors of the de minimis framework for false
advertising-based Section 2 liability are responsive to these concerns. 39 In any
event, actual harm becomes nearly impossible to prove in most settings. In
most cases, any observed impact on the plaintiff’s sales or market share could
have been the consequence of any one of numerous factors.
While the authors limit the presumption to monopolists and attempted
monopolists, which “narrows the universe of false advertising/antitrust
claims,” this limitation does not go far enough to ensure a causal link between
false statements and market-wide harm. 40 The Carrier/Tushnet presumption
would produce more cases decided using an unrestrained approach, such as
in Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co., where the court upheld a treble
damages judgment of $1.05 billion based on tortious activity even though
market output and product variety were not shown to be impacted during the
relevant time period. 41 In that case, no causal relationship was established
between the defendant’s tortious conduct and the plaintiff’s sales, and
certainly not from the false advertising in particular. 42 Such an unrestrained

38. Taylor Publ’g Co. v. Jostens, Inc., 216 F.3d 465, 477 n.5 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding it was
not exclusionary conduct for a firm to lure customers away from a competitor with low price
offers, only to later “upgrade” by selling them additional services; plaintiff did not dispute that
customers were not forced to accept the upgrades and were not locked into services with the
defendant); see also SMS Sys. Maint. Servs., Inc. v. Digit. Equip. Corp., 188 F.3d 11, 19–20 (1st
Cir. 1999) (rejecting Section 2 monopolization claim that defendant used generous warranty
contracts to lock in customers where the customers’ actual behavior indicated they were willing
and able to switch to other suppliers).
39. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 29 and accompanying text. Justification for the
individual factors comes from the concerns with causation and with identifying false statements
briefly outlined in this response. For further analysis, see id. (manuscript at ¶¶ 782a1, 782b);
Hovenkamp, supra note 15 (manuscript at 29–34).
40. See Carrier & Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1870. It is not clear whether the authors’
presumption would import the elements of a Lanham Act claim without including the applicable
statutory standing requirements, which address courts’ concerns with causation and policy in the
false advertising context. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118,
133–34 (2014) (holding that “the zone-of-interests test and the proximate-cause requirement
suppl[y] the relevant limits on who may sue” and help guard against “suits for alleged harm that
is ‘too remote’ from the defendant’s unlawful conduct”).
41. Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 773, 789–91, 795 (6th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 1148 (2003).
42. Id. at 789 (“There was evidence at trial that total market output increased in the moist
snuff industry during the relevant period.”); see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 29
(manuscript at ¶ 782a2) (noting that in Conwood, the “court was so overwhelmed with a clear and
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approach to analyzing false advertising risks using antitrust as a tool for
regulating truthfulness in the marketplace and as a punishment for bigness
when monopolists engage in tortious conduct.
IV. LOWER LIABILITY THRESHOLD FOR PRODUCT DISPARAGEMENT IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY?
Carrier and Tushnet identify the serious harm that can result from a
dominant firm’s false advertising in markets for biologics. 43 These harms also
could result in cases of generic disparagement in markets for small-molecule
drugs. The pharmaceutical industry has particular characteristics that affect
the concerns associated with establishing causation and identifying clearly
false statements. Here, a rebuttable presumption of liability still is not
suitable—antitrust law should not dispense with requiring evidence that false
advertising could harm competition—but the high threshold applicable in
the Seventh Circuit also is inadequate.
False advertising of physician-prescribed pharmaceuticals is a little
different than false advertising generally. The differences roughly resemble
protected speech in political and adjudicative settings. Under antitrust’s NoerrPennington doctrine, false statements in the commercial arena are given wide
berth for all of the reasons enumerated in Part III. 44 In this context, false
statements are taken less seriously, are readily combatted, and proof of
causation is very difficult to come by. 45
Things change, however, when speech occurs in a more adjudicative
context, as in judicial or administrative settings. Speech in such settings
sometimes is given under oath but, even more frequently, occurs in situations
where government reliance is anticipated. As a result, speech is taken more
seriously in these settings, and there is often a more direct causal chain linking
the speech to a particular adverse outcome. For this reason, antitrust policy
has always been very tolerant of false statements made in political or public
arenas but more critical of false statements made to a court or administrative
agency operating in an adjudicative capacity.
As Carrier and Tushnet recognize, statements disparaging U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (“FDA”)-approved biosimilars and generics typically are
clearly false since FDA approval requires equivalence. 46 Doctors are
motivated, ethically and professionally, to optimize patient treatment (within
the constraints of the healthcare system), and false statements undermining

varied record of tortious business conduct that it largely dispensed with proof that an antitrust
violation had occurred” and “permitted damages to be based on procompetitive conduct”).
43. See Carrier & Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1881.
44. See supra Part III; see also E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127,
140–45 (1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669–72 (1965); see also
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 29 (manuscript at ¶¶ 201–08) (analyzing the doctrine in both
political and adjudicatory contexts).
45. See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text.
46. Carrier & Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1866–69.
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perceptions of a biosimilar or generic’s efficacy or safety are material. 47
Studies on physician prescribing practices show that statements from
pharmaceutical industry representatives are capable of inducing reasonable
reliance. 48 Physicians and patients also lack the resources and knowledge to
independently verify the performance of a biosimilar or generic drug
compared to the brand name equivalent. On the other hand, physicians have
some discretion and may consider multiple factors, including the preferences
of their patients, when making decisions, which creates difficulties
establishing causation for section 2 liability. Also, competing drug
manufacturers are free to inform or persuade prescribers “on the merits.” But
even though a biosimilar or generic drug manufacturer theoretically may be
able to combat disparaging remarks, the brand name incumbent has an edge
with respect to both physician and patient preferences. 49
While these factors do not obviate the concerns underlying the de minimis
test, a lower threshold for antitrust liability could be sensible for biosimilar
and generic drug disparagement. It bears repetition, however, that antitrust
liability, as opposed to the more routine penalties that are attached to
violations of regulatory penalties, still requires proof of causation and
competitive harm.
V. CONCLUSION
In most cases of commercial false advertising by a monopolist or wouldbe monopolist, a rebuttable presumption of liability is too unrestrained and
does not satisfy antitrust’s causation requirement. However, in contexts where
reliance and materiality are likely, as in the pharmaceutical industry, a lower
threshold is more suitable. The FDA regulatory framework, the physician
–patient relationship, and the constraints of the healthcare system together
make it more likely that false statements could harm competition.

47. For an overview of the Hippocratic Tradition, bioethics, and medical-moral philosophy
in multiple countries, see generally Fabrice Jotterand, The Hippocratic Oath and Contemporary
Medicine: Dialectic Between Past Ideals and Present Reality?, 30 J. MED. & PHIL. 107 (2005).
48. Michael A. Carrier, Three Challenges for Pharmaceutical Antitrust, 59 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
615, 616 (2020) (“This disconnect has created a gap that can be exploited. Brand firms can
convince doctors to prescribe expensive drugs even if equally effective cheaper drugs are
available.”).
49. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 186 F.3d 781, 787 (7th Cir. 1999)
(observing that brand-name drugs may lack perfect substitutes, and “physicians who prescribe the
[brand-name] drug may continue to prescribe the branded version rather than the generic
substitute, whether out of inertia, or because they think the branded version may be produced
under better quality control” or due to “greater confidence in a familiar brand”).

